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1. The fair wage concept: a „catch-all“ in the discussion on wage
determination
The fair wage-effort hypothesis brought forward by AKERLOF (1982) was meant
to explain why workers are paid more than their market-clearing wage and why
unemployment may persist as a consequence: Employers offer wages above the
market-clearing level in exchange for „productivity or quality enhancing beha-
viors from employees“ (REBITZER/TAYLOR 1995: 678). As long as these wage
increases „pay for themselves“ (LEVINE 1992), both workers and employers are
able to benefit from the system of „a fair day's work for a fair day's wage“ (SO-
LOW 1990: 33).
But what constitutes the fair wage? Is it fair to pay a wage which is at least as
high as the one paid before as e.g. AKERLOF (1982: 556), LEVINE (1993: 1242)
and WADHWANI/WALL (1991: 545) assume? Is it fair to be paid the same wage as
the „social neighbours“ (SCHMID 1992: 36) are? Who are these social neighbours:
comparable workers in the same firm (AKERLOF/YELLEN  1990: 270), in
comparable firms, or in unemployment (AKERLOF 1982: 555, COSTABILE 1996:
615)? Is the fair wage determined by the market wage (whatever this may be) as
AKERLOF/YELLEN (1990: 270) suppose? Are fairness perceptions influenced by
collectively set wages (SCHLICHT 1992: 438; SCHNABEL 1995: 33)? Is it fair to
pay a high wage when profits are high (DICKENS/KATZ 1987: 50; LEVINE 1992:
1113; 1993: 1242; FITZROY/KRAFT 1992: 209) or when unemployment is low
and local wage level and living standard are high, as SCHLICHT (1992: 447ff.) as-
sumes?
Given its ambiguity, it does not come as a surprise that the fair wage concept has
been used to explain so many of the stylized facts on wage-setting behaviour:
Wages increase in time because this is regarded as fair, wages are similar for
comparable workers because this is also regarded as fair, wages rise when unem-
ployment benefits rise, when the market wage rises, when the collectively set
wage rises, when profits go up, when unemployment goes down or when living
standards increase. All of this is regarded as fair. The fair wage concept has thus
become a „catch-all“, present whenever called upon to explain any observed par-
ticularity of wage-setting behaviour. Its success in the literature1 might indeed be
closely related to its ambiguity as a theoretical concept.
Acknowledging the importance of fairness norms in labour relations, this paper
tries to substantiate what constitutes the fair wage. It will be argued that what
workers and employers consider „fair“ can be interpreted as the result of „as-if-
                                             
1 See e.g. DICKENS/KATZ (1987: 84); KRUEGER/SUMMERS (1988: 278); LEVINE (1991: 238);
REBITZER (1993: 1418).3
co-operation”: If the employer sets the wage according to the rules of a co-opera-
tive game he will meet worker fairness conceptions. The implications of this
assumption are not only surprisingly compatible with the stylized facts on wage
setting behaviour. They also allow for the analysis of the net effect of the deter-
minants of the fair wage – something which is out of reach in the present state of
the fair wage concept. The paper will proceed as follows: Section 2 contains a
brief review of the experimental evidence on ultimatum and related games. These
are presented not only to highlight the potential importance of fairness norms in
labour relations (section 2.1), they also hint at the idea of the fair wage being the
result of as-if-co-operation (section 2.2). Section 3 presents a simple model where
the fair wage is assumed to be the result of as-if-co-operation and confronts the
model implications with the stylized facts on wage setting behaviour, section 4
contains a short summary.
2. Experimental games and the concept of as-if-co-operation
2.1 Ultimatum and related games: their relevance for labour relations
What do economic agents consider as fair? What in particular is a fair wage? Ex-
perimental game theory might give the answer. In the so-called ultimatum game,
where one person (player 1) is asked to divide a given amount of money between
another person (player 2) and himself and where then player 2 can decide whether
to accept this division or walk away (in which event none of the two gets
anything) it has been shown that people do not at all behave in accordance with
the prescriptions of economic theory: Instead of offering only a marginal amount
to player 2 (which – assuming “rational” behaviour of player 2 – should then be
accepted as it is better than nothing), „offers typically average about 30-40 per-
cent of the total, with a 50-50 split often the mode“ (CAMERER/THALER 1995:
210).2
Why should player 1 behave in this way? Why should he offer more than just a
marginal amount? Is he led by a fear of rejection? There is indeed experimental
evidence from ultimatum games illustrating that player 2 is ready to reject small
                                             
2 In the experiment run by GÜTH/SCHMITTBERGER/SCHWARZE (1982) proposing players of-
fered about 35% of the cake on average (cf. KIRCHSTEIGER 1994: 347), STRAUB/MURNI-
GHAN (1995: 353) report mean offers between 33% and 46%. According to CAMERER
(1997: 169) the typical offer is 40-50 percent of the amount at stake, the experiment having
been replicated in several countries for stakes up to an amount of two months’ wages.4
amounts.3 Player 2 might be led by equity norms (SELTEN 1978; GÜTH 1994). the
violation of which might weigh high enough to make him not accept the offer
even though he can only lose on this. Player 2 then might seek to „punish“ player
1 for an „insultingly low” offer (GÜTH/DAMME 1994: 1) or in BOLTON’s (1997:
366) words: „acquiring a ‘fair share’ seems a strong motivation force”.4
But even in dictator games player 1 (the dictator) passes a positive amount to pla-
yer 2, even though the latter cannot veto his decision (STRAUB/MURNIGHAN
1995: 348). Player 1 thus apparently does also act according to internalised
norms of fairness and equity when offering more than marginal amounts and is
not only led by fear of rejection but also by a „do-as-you-would-be-done-by prin-
ciple” (BINMORE 1998: 276). Still, the fact that offers in dictator games generally
are „not quite as fair“ as those in ultimatum games (CAMERER 1997: 169) again
seems to question the idea of internalised norms of fairness as being the sole ex-
planation for the observed behaviour in ultimatum and related games.5
Nevertheless, there seem to be forces at work that lead the parties to an agree-
ment that standard (non-co-operative) game theory cannot explain. Can these for-
ces (which will be analyzed in more detail in section 2.2) explain wage-setting
behaviour as well? In labour relations it is the employer who acts as player 1 and
offers a wage to the worker (player 2). As in the ultimatum game the worker can
indeed „punish“ the employer, e.g. through the choice of a low effort level. The
employer then might not be left with nothing if punished by the worker for an
„insultingly low” offer but he ends up in a situation where what is left to him is
less than what he could have gained if he had offered a „fairer distribution“. The
worker, too, does receive his share, but he also could have been better off.
However, it might be argued, ultimatum game experiments differ in important re-
spects from wage determination: First, while players in ultimatum games typi-
cally cannot interact, employer and worker typically can. It has been shown, how-
                                             
3 GÜTH/SCHMITTBERGER/SCHWARZE (1982: 384) report „subjects do not hesitate to punish if
their opponent asks for ‘too much’“; KIRCHSTEIGER (1994: 374) speaks of „non-negligible“
rejection rates. According to KNEZ/CAMERER (1995: 2f) rejection rates in ultimatum game
experiments vary from 5 to 25% – the mean rejected offer being as high as 20% of the
amount divided. Especially low offers are typically rejected by a majority of respondents:
In the experiment run by STRAUB/MURNIGHAN (1995: 352) about 75% of the respondents
rejected an offer of $0.01.
4 The result of STRAUB/MURNIGHAN (1995: 352) seems to support this interpretation: if
respondents did not know the size of the cake and could not judge it to be either „insulting-
ly low“ or „only fair“ the rejection rate for an amount of $0.01 fell from about 75% in the
full information case to only just 40%.
5 The result by STRAUB/MURNIGHAN (1995: 348) who report that „when respondents did not
know the amount being divided, offerers offered ... significantly lower offers“ hints in the
same direction. See also the evidence reported in footnote 9.5
ever, that the more the parties are allowed to interact, the higher the probability
that fairness norms are activated (FREY/BOHNET 1995: 291f.). Fairness conside-
rations thus should be even more important in labour relations than in ultimatum
games. Second, it might be argued, while what is at stake in ultimatum games
comes as a „gift“, wages and remaining profits are typically regarded as some-
thing which has been „earned“ by the parties. In the so-called reward allocation
game, however, where both parties have to perform a common task before player
1 gets the chance to distribute a sum of money, the equal division of the amount
at stake again is „a frequent outcome” – even in those cases where player 1 is told
that he contributed more to the common goal than player 2 (SELTEN 1978: 290f.).
In labour relations fairness norms then should play at least an equally important
role as in ultimatum game experiments. Third, while the two players in ultimatum
games cannot choose among a range of possible bargaining partners, employers
and workers typically can. If there e.g. is excess supply of workers the risk of
rejection which presumably is one of the forces leading player 1 to offer a „fair”
distribution could be less relevant for the employer than it is for player 1 in the
ultimatum game. FEHR ET AL. (1998: 329) can indeed show that this „competitive
element” of labour relations might reduce wage offers in case there is excess
supply of workers as compared to the situation in the standard ultimatum game
experiment. These competitive forces, however, lose their effect when the game
is repeated for a few rounds. The often long-term character of labour relations
thus should reduce the competitive element. In so far as labour relations involve
specific investments and successively lead to a situation of a bilateral bargain
between employer and worker the competitive element should turn more and
more negligible.6
The empirical evidence on ultimatum game experiments consequently should be
of relevance for labour relations. If fairness plays a role in ultimatum game ex-
periments it should do so as well in labour relations. But what else can be learned
from experimental games? Are there any hints as to the determinants of the ulti-
matum game solution? Can we derive a model that is capable of capturing the de-
terminants of the wage setting process as well? The following section tries to
give an answer.
                                             
6 Apart from that, proposers can be expected and are also observed to learn from past beha-
viour. If they, e.g., underestimated respondents’ readiness to reject low offers in previous
rounds they typically adjust their offers subsequently (even if they play against a different
respondent in each round): In the repeated ultimatum game experiment cited by ROTH
(1995: 277), where offerers played ten consecutive games against different respondents,
mean offers in the last round were about 10 percent higher than the ones in the first round.6
2.2 The concept of as-if-co-operation: the invisible hand of the fair
arbitrator
In what follows it will be argued that even though players in ultimatum game ex-
periments find themselves in a non-co-operative game, they seem to behave as if
they were taking part in a co-operative game: The solution they typically arrive at
is not only in sharp contrast to the solution rational players ought to arrive at ac-
cording to (non-co-operative) game theory but it surprisingly resembles the solu-
tion one would expect in a co-operative game (where binding agreements can be
signed – something which is obviously not the case in the ultimatum game ex-
periment). Players in ultimatum games seem to behave as if they had signed a
binding agreement. They apparently have an (implicit) understanding of how the
amount at stake should be divided between them – the understanding being to
divide the cake according to the rules of a co-operative game.
What are the rules of a co-operative game? What is the solution prescribed? Co-
operative game-theory is best been represented by its most prominent solution,
the NASH bargaining solution (NASH 1950, 1953).7 According to this solution,
two players in a co-operative game reach an agreement where the product of their
utility gains (compared to their fall-back positions) is maximized.
Let V represent utility of player 1 and U utility of player 2, respectively, with V
and U representing the relevant fall-backs. Then the NASH bargaining solution is
given by maximizing the so-called NASH product Ω :
Ω= − ⋅ − () () V V U U (2.2.-1)
The NASH bargaining solution of a co-operative game where a given amount has
to be divided among two players and where the relevant fall-back-positions both
are zero (none of the two gets anything when no agreement is reached as is the
case in ultimatum games), results in an equal division of the amount at stake: Let
utility of player 2 still be denoted by U and what is left to player 2 by (1-U) (the
size of the cake being standardized to 1), then the NASH product is given as fol-
lows:
Ω= − ⋅ = − () 1 2 UUUU (2.2-2)
Maximizing with respect to U gives:
U*. = 05; V*. = 05 (2.2-3)
Equity theory, however, is also capable of explaining the equal split in ultimatum
games: According to equity theory, it would be regarded as fair if the two players
                                             
7 As in CARLIN/SOSKICE (1990: 393) „... this is not the place to conduct a survey of bargai-
ning theory [...] It is reassuring to note that, although the different approaches to bargaining
solutions use quite different arguments, they turn out to produce similar results.”7
received a share of the amount at stake corresponding to their respective inputs
(GÜTH 1994: 156). As the positions of the two players are assigned arbitrarily in
the standard ultimatum game, and non of the two has “earned” his position in the
game, they both should walk away with the same amount. But equity theory only
applies to situations where players, apart from their possibly different inputs, are
identical. Differences in power, however, representing a major characteristic of
labour relations, cannot be accounted for by equity theory.8 In that context the
asymmetric version of the NASH bargaining solution applies.
Let  1 λ  denote bargaining power of player 1, and λ 2 bargaining power of player 2
with 1 , 0 2 1 < λ λ <  and  1 2 1 = λ + λ . According to the asymmetric NASH bargai-
ning solution the two players reach an agreement where the product of their utili-
ty gains, weighted by their respective bargaining powers, is maximized:
Ω= − ⋅ − () () VV UU
λλ 12 (2.2-4)
Applying this to the situation of dividing a cake of size 1 between two players re-
sults in:
Ω= − ⋅ () 1
12 UU
λλ (2.2-5)
Taking logs and maximizing with respect to U gives:
U*=λ 2¸V*=λ 1 (2.2-6)
What is assigned to the parties immediately results from the distribution of bar-
gaining power. The better the bargaining position of a player the larger his share
in the game.9
In what follows it will be assumed that people faced with the problem of having
to share behave as if they found themselves in a co-operative game and offer a di-
stribution according to the NASH bargaining solution taking account of differen-
ces in bargaining power. In the literature the NASH bargaining solution is regu-
larly described as „agreement a fair arbitrator would suggest“ (DE MENIL 1971: 7;
see also: MCDONALD/SOLOW 1981: 904; CURRIE 1994) where the fair arbitrator
is „fair” in so far as he sticks to the arbitration procedure set up by the bargaining
                                             
8 SELTEN (1978: 298), too, calls wage bargaining a „non-equitable distribution conflict”,
where equity theory „cannot be applied”.
9 The results of GÜTH/DAMME (1994) who introduced a third, but inactive, (dummy) player
in the ultimatum game are illustrative: While player 1 offers about 30% of the stake to pla-
yer 2 (whose veto would leave all of them with nothing) he offers only 5-10% to player 3
(the dummy player). Undoubtedly player 2 is in a much better „bargaining position” than
player 3. At the same time, however, the experiment (and the above cited evidence on dic-
tator games) illustrates that bargaining power is not necessarily being „exploited” by the
bargaining partners. But obviously an unequal distribution of bargaining power would re-
sult in a deviation from the equal split suggested by equity theory in favour of the party who
is in the better bargaining position.8
partners (CARLIN/SOSKICE 1990: 392). Assuming the NASH bargaining solution
to be the one people agree on (in ultimatum games as well as in labour relations)
is equivalent to assuming that people accept the division a fair arbitrator would
have suggested. The fair arbitrator, of course, is not there; it is his „invisible
hand“ that leads the parties to the agreement both can accept.
What is this agreement in the wage determination process? What are the determi-
nants of the fair wage – once we accept the NASH bargaining solution to
represent people’s fairness perceptions? This, of course, crucially depends on the
specification of worker and employer utility and their respective bargaining
positions.
3.  The fair arbitrator at work: What determines the fair wage?
3.1 Model specification
Let worker utility be given in wage w and employer utility in profits Π , the latter
being a function of returns R and labour costs wL ⋅ , where L stands for employ-
ment and labour is the only (and homogenous) input. Let returns be increasing in
wages (at diminishing rates) to capture the idea that higher wages evoke higher
effort levels and that these in turn have positive effects on output quantity or qua-
lity. Let fall-back utilities of both, worker and employer, for simplicity at this
point each be 0. Let λ 1 denote bargaining power of the employer, and λ 2 bargai-
ning power of the employee with 0 1 12 << λλ ,  and λλ 12 1 += .10
Uw = (3.1-1)
L w ) w ( R V ⋅ − = Π = with: 0 ' R > ; 0 ' ' R < (3.1-2)
UV ==0 (3.1-3)
The NASH-product Ω  is then given by:
Ω= − ⋅ ⋅ (() ) Rw wL w
λλ 12 (3.1-4)
                                             
10 Although extremely simplifying, these assumptions are not at all uncommon in the litera-
ture on wage bargaining: The assumption that worker utility is a function of the wage rate
only and that employees are risk-neutral is made e.g. by MUYSKENS/VEEN (1996), HOLDEN
(1988, 1990), MOENE (1988), MCDONALD/SUEN (1992) and FEHR (1990). Employer utility
almost always is determined by profits alone, and employer risk-aversion is generally not
taken into account (see e.g. AOKI  1984; DE  MENIL  1971; NICKELL/ANDREWS  1983;
NICKELL 1984). Fall-back utilities of 0 are assumed e.g. by LINDBECK/SNOWER (1991) and
OSWALD (1987). See footnote 17, however, to see what would happen if positive fall-back
positions were assumed.9





2 ⋅ λ −
⋅ λ = (3.1-5)
The fair arbitrator would set a wage w* increasing in worker bargaining power
λ 2, increasing in returns R, decreasing in the employment level L and increasing
in the sensitivity of returns with respect to wages  ' R. 11
While returns, employment level, and the effect of wages on returns are well un-
derstood as theoretical concepts (although not necessarily easily measured empi-
rically) the determinants of worker bargaining power are „rather controversial“
(DALMAZZO 1995: 121), to say the least. However, it should be rather uncontro-
versial to assume bargaining power to be a function of „the availability of alter-
native sources of income“12 on the one hand and „the degree of commitment to
the outcome at stake in the bargaining“ on the other (EMERSON 1962). Applied to
labour relations one would then expect worker bargaining power to be the higher
the better his chances on the external labour market (the better his „alternative in-
come sources“) and the more the employer has invested in the relation in terms of
firm-specific training (the greater the employer’s „commitment“ to the labour
contract or the greater his risk to be held-up by the worker).
3.2 Implications, plausibility and empirical evidence
Starting with the idea of worker fairness perceptions being influenced by what a
fair arbitrator would have suggested and accepting the specifications of the pro-
posed simple model of as-if-co-operation the question on the determinants of a
fair wage can be answered as follows:
-  The better the outside options of a worker (the higher the wage he could get
elsewhere and the better his chances to get a job elsewhere) and the easier the
worker can hold-up the employer (the more the employer has „invested“ in
worker specific human capital), the better the worker’s bargaining position
and the higher the fair wage and, as a consequence, the higher the effectively
paid wage.
                                             
11 A necessary condition for equation 11 to prescribe a maximum is:
0 L ' R dU dV < − =
This is equivalent to the requirement of PARETO-optimality.
12 It should be noted that these outside options are to be differentiated from the fall-back posi-
tions. See BINMORE/RUBINSTEIN/WOLINSKY (1986: 185) for a general discussion of this
question.10
That wages typically increase when regional unemployment decreases is widely
accepted and summarized in the literature on the wage curve.13 A correlation bet-
ween regional wage rate and wage level has also been frequently found.14 In so far
as a worker’s general human capital can serve as an indicator for his ability to find
another job the correlation between „years of education“ and wage level as mea-
sured by numerous empirical studies on the relevance of MINCER earnings func-
tions provides further support to the model of as-if-co-operation.15
A direct test on the correlation between worker specific human capital and wage
level is not available. However, with the help of „QUIPPE“, a data set on the per-
sonnel policies of European firms where more than 80 firms in 4 different coun-
tries were questioned (see BACKES-GELLNER/BÖCK/WIENECKE 1994) it can be
shown that the more workers participated in further training (as a percentage of all
workers in the firm) the higher the wage paid in the firm (PULL 1996: 178).
- The higher returns, the higher the fair wage and the higher the effectively
paid wage.
HOLDEN (1990), e.g. can show a positive correlation between effectively paid wa-
ges and returns; SCHNABEL (1994: 17) finds a close long-term relationship bet-
ween effectively paid wages and firm-level gross valued added (in real terms).
- The lower the employment level, i.e. the less workers there are who demand a
share of what is at stake, the higher the fair wage and the higher the effective-
ly paid wage.
A correlation between employment and wage level has been shown in numerous
empirical studies – always in the direction prescribed: the higher the employment
level (capital input being held constant) the lower the wage.16
- The larger the sensitivity of returns with respect to wages (the greater the pos-
sibilities of the worker to influence the size of what is at stake, and the more
                                             
13 See CARD (1995) for a review. MCDONALD/SUEN (1992) who try to measure worker bar-
gaining power empirically also identify „unemployment” as a major determinant of trade
union power (and, as a result, of the wage level). Also the fact that GERLACH/WAGNER
(1995) have failed to show a correlation between regional long-term-unemployment and the
regional wage rate seems to fit the model: A low level of regional unemployment enters the
wage equation as a determinant of worker bargaining power: the worker can „threaten“ to
quit the job and work elsewhere without incurring high costs to himself. The level of long-
term-unemployment, however, can be expected not to directly influence the worker’s chan-
ces of finding a new job once he quitted the old one: the long-term-unemployed are typical-
ly expected not to be true competitors for vacancies in the regional labour market (see e.g.
SCHLICHT 1995).
14 See e.g. BLANCHFLOWER/OSWALD/GARRETT (1990); NICKELL/WADHWANI (1990); HOLM-
LUND/SKEDINGER (1990).
15 In their empirical analysis of British establishments BLANCHFLOWER/OSWALD/GARRETT
(1990: 159) even find „no evidence of insider influence in the unskilled non-union sector”.
16 See e.g. ABOWD/KRAMARZ/MARGOLIS  (1994); FITZROY/KRAFT (1992), DICKENS/KATZ
(1987), NICKELL (1988) or ERIKSSON/SUVANTO/VARTIA (1990).11
he is likely to be motivated by a higher wage), the higher is the fair wage and
the effectively paid wage.
In the analysis by MEYER (1994: 227f) the wage gap (difference between the col-
lectively set wage and the actually paid wage) was higher if wage setters assumed
income to be a good motivator. TESCHNER (1977) reports that effectively paid wa-
ges are higher for workers in responsible positions, i.e. in positions where the di-
rect and indirect influence on output can be expected to be rather large. BLANCH-
FLOWER (1991), too, comes to the conclusion „[b]eing a supervisor raises pay”.
The implications derived thus seem to be plausible and fit the stylized facts of
wage setting behaviour.17 Unlike the fair wage concept in its current state the
presented model of as-if-co-operation allows for the derivation of hypotheses on
possible cross effects between the determinants of the fair wage and on the que-
stion if an increase in, e.g., worker bargaining power would result in increasing,
constant or diminishing increases in the fair wage. Among others, the following
hypotheses can be derived:
-  The fair wage should increase when regional unemployment decreases or the
regional wage rate goes up, and it should do so at diminishing rates:
0
) ' R L (
















! % !& ’
(3.2-1)
The same is true for a worker‘s specific human capital which is also assumed
to influence the fair wage through its effect on bargaining power. We would
thus expect diminishing rates of return for specific human capital accumula-
tion – something which is regularly assumed for human capital accumulation
in general and typically justified by decreasing productivity effects as the le-
vel of already acquired human capital increases. Here, however, diminishing
rates of return for specific human capital accumulation result from a decrea-
sing effect of bargaining power on the wage level.
                                             
17 It also seems to be of interest what would happen if fall-back utilities were not assumed to
be equal to zero. Here the collectively set wage or minimum wage enters the model. It can
be shown that under reasonable assumptions the collectively set wage has a positive influ-
ence on the fair wage (see PULL/SADOWSKI 1997: 73f) – even when the fall-back position
of the employer is assumed to rise with the fall-back position of the worker (see MUYS-
KENS/VEEN 1996): The higher the collectively set wage, the higher is the fair wage (within
the limits of profitability). According to BLUM (1983: 264), KÜLP (1976: 111) and ROBAK
(1978: 49, 91) actually paid wages and collectively set wages are indeed highly correlated.
The wage gap on the other hand seems to decrease when the collectively set wage increases
(SCHNABEL 1994: 19f; LEVER 1991) – an implication which can also be derived from the
model of as-if-co-operation (see PULL/SADOWSKI 1997 for the details).12
- Furthermore we would expect the effect of regional unemployment, regional
wage level and specific human capital to be larger, when returns are high:
0














In a situation where returns are high (and wages are, too) a change in labour
market conditions should result in a larger change of the wage than in a situa-
tion where returns are low: With higher returns the component of the wage
which is determined by bargaining power (the share of returns that adds to the
fixum given by the fall-back-position) increases.
In the same way hypotheses on possible cross-effects between the other determi-
nants of the fair wage can be derived. They demand an empirical test, however,
which is beyond reach in this paper. The fact that the bivariate implications al-
ready fit the stylized facts is promising and will hopefully inspire further empi-
rical as well as theoretical work on the fair wage concept.
4. Summary
The fair wage concept has become a catch-all used to explain virtually any ob-
served particularity of wage-setting behaviour. Acknowledging the importance of
fairness in the wage determination process an attempt is made to model worker
fairness conceptions. Based on experimental evidence in ultimatum games it is
argued that worker fairness conceptions might be influenced by what the result of
a co-operative game would have been, i.e. by what a fair arbitrator would have
suggested. The fair wage then becomes a function of worker outside options, em-
ployer commitment in the contractual relation, employment level, returns and the
sensitivity of returns with respect to wages. The implications derived are compa-
tible with the stylized facts of wage determination. Unlike the fair wage concept
in its current state the proposed model of as-if-co-operation allows for the analy-
sis of possible cross-effects concerning the determinants of the fair wage. Their
test is left for further studies.13
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